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Abstract:
While private tutoring leads to a low social rate of return with substantive opportunity as well as
transaction costs, research reveals that investments in private tutoring genders a high private rate
of return for parents who are willing to allocate resources in terms of time and money to improve
their wards chances of getting higher scores in exams. Considering such stakes, this paper
introduces game-theoretic models of parents’ decision making on the consumption of private
tutoring given the interactions among the public and private school going children as well as
possible interventions by the government. By applying a three-stage behavioral game theoretical
set up, we develop private tutoring game models using the key stakeholders comprising the higher
authority of both public and private schools, teachers involved with private tutoring, and the
parents. Our preliminary results reveal that teachers’ dutifulness increases with salary but with
professional development, the result is ambiguous. A teacher’s expected income is decreasing in
school infrastructure through fall in private tuition demand but increasing in teacher’s salary.
However, from higher authorities’ point of view, if they care only about the total education of the
students and is unmindful of the sources of student education, they would not mind lowering the
teachers’ wage, even if the policy reduces teacher dutifulness. Given such developments, parents
are expected to support policies that encourage more private tutoring from the teachers since it
leads to higher parental utility and overall education level for the students.

JEL Classifications: I21, C72
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Introduction
Private tutoring (PT) or supplementary education is a growing industry in many developing as well
as developed countries (Bray and Kobakhidze, 2014a; Bray, 2009; Dang and Rogers, 2008).
According a cross-sectional survey conducted by Dang and Rogers (2008), around twenty-five
percent (25%) to ninety percent (90%) of students in twenty-two (22) developed and developing
countries received private tutoring at various levels of their education. Bray (2003, 2009) also
found private tutoring to be prevalent and increasing at significant rates among countries all over
the world irrespective of their income status (Table 1).

Moreover, spending by households on

private tutoring even rivals public sector education expenditures in some countries such as the
Republic of Korea and Turkey (Dang and Rogers, 2008). In some countries, governments contract
with private companies to provide academic support for disadvantaged students (Patrinos et al.,
2009). For example, the number of private companies providing supplemental academic services
(academic tutoring) in the United States increased by 90 percent between 2003 and 2004. This is
partly attributed to the increase in federal funds allocated to support supplemental education as
well as the federal law that require all school districts in USA to provide supplemental education
services both to schools that have not made adequately yearly progress for three consecutive years,
and to schools with high percentages of poor children (more than 40 percent) or students with
special needs (Burch, Steinberg, and Donovan, 2007).1
Despite private tutoring’s capacity to increase parental choice and improve student achievement,
concerns abound whether private tutoring aggravates social inequalities as well as impose
significant costs on households if student outcomes fail to meet their required goals. To address
such concerns, most studies explored the private tutoring influence on a public school environment
and identify policy options for the government by assessing the efficiency and equity trade-offs of
private tutoring. However, few studies looked into the influence of private tutoring on parental,
school teachers, and government choices from a game theoretical model perspective. In our paper,

1

According to the United States Department of Education (2007), the supplemental services include afterschool
tutoring, remediation, and other academic support activities that take place outside regular school hours. Between
2000 and 2003, the supplemental services industry grew by an average of 14 percent annually (Hentschke 2005). Main
requirements of the program are the private providers offering high-quality and research-based services as well as
having few barriers to entry in the supplemental education services (Burch, Steinberg, and Donovan, 2007).
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we look into the possible interactions among parents, teachers, and the government to identify
optimal choices of the parties in a private tutoring market using a game theoretical setup. We focus
on the improvement of the overall level of school education based on the optimal choices pursued
by the affected parties with private tutoring. Our paper does not address the issue of increasing
social inequalities that might arise due to lack of access to private tutoring for households arising
from income and wealth inequalities and, other contingent factors.

Literature Review
Private tutoring, which is an international phenomenon, is defined as the after-school or outsideschool supplementary lessons provided by teachers informally to students needing academic
assistance (de Castro and de Guzman, 2014; Dang and Rogers, 2008). Private supplementary
tutoring is also termed as shadow education activity that mimics the academic activities offered
by formal schools (Bray and Kobakhidze, 2014a; de Castro and de Guzman, 2013). According to
Bray (2003), private tutoring covers coaching and instructing in academic subjects by tutors for
financial gains and in addition to the provision of mainstream schooling. Marimuthu al. (1991)
metaphorically treats private tutoring as a shadow education system in the sense that the latter term
signifies the hidden nature of private tutoring and the way in which it mirrors the formal education
system in scope, intensity and size. Based on the conclusions of Marimuthu et al. (1991), the
application of a shadow metaphor for private tutoring fits in three ways: (1) private tutoring exists
because of a perceived or real deficiency in mainstream education systems; (2) the shape and size
of mainstream education systems change so do the sizes, function and shape of private tutoring;
and, (3) public attention is more apt to focus on the mainstream issue than on its shadow.

Conversely, Hartmann (2013, 2008) treats private tutoring to be not just a passive entity but the
one that poised to negatively affect the body it imitates. Hartmann (2008) uses the phrase “informal
market of education” in contrast to the shadow education system, where she puts more emphasis
on the aspect of “commodification.” Critics like her are worried about the perception of education
being turned into a marketable good or into the object of a commercial transaction as a result of
significant presence of private tutoring. Moreover, there exist shared concerns about whether
widespread presence and application of private tutoring exacerbates social and income inequality
in developed and developing countries around the world (Dang and Rogers, 2013). Although
3
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evidence indicate that private tutoring to have positive impact on different measures of student
aptitude such as student test scores and academic performance in Africa (Paviot et al., 2008), India
(Banerjee et al., 2010), Ireland (Smyth, 2009), Hong Kong (Bray, 2013), and the United States
(Zimmer et al., 2010), such apprehensions associated with overall welfare impacts of private
tutoring cannot be refuted or denied.

Following the interactions between the demand (parents and students) and supply (teachers) in the
private tutoring market and how it shaped the industry in Philippines, de Castro and de Guzman
(2014) categorized the stakeholders of private tutoring into three types: (1) Lean on; (2) Ride on;
and, (3) Pass on. Their categorization is based on four criteria of for whom, for what, with whom
and by whom (de Castro and de Guzman, 2014). Table 2 summarizes their classifications of type
of interdependence behavior among the parents and students representing the demand side, the
teachers, learning centers, and the multinational institutions representing the supply side, and the
government representing the regulator side.

However, studies on private tutoring reveals the ambiguity associated in measuring the actual
impacts of private tutoring since the industry can assume multifarious forms given the socioeconomic and the regulatory institutions of a given country and the lack of systematic data due to
informal nature of the industry (de Castro and de Guzman, 2014; Bray and Kobakhidze, 2014b;
Dang and Rogers, 2013; Mori and Baker, 2010). Despite such obstacles, there are considerable
number of studies that looked into the possible impacts and policy implications of private tutoring.
Regarding government’s role, findings reveal mixed policy responses in dealing with the private
tutoring market. Although private tutoring is unregulated in majority of the countries, there are
some countries where it is either controlled or actively regulated (Dang and Rogers, 2008).
Governments of countries such as Cambodia, South Korea, Mauritius, and Myanmar banned
private tutoring at various times because of their concern that that long-term negative impacts of
private tutoring far outweighs the positive benefits in terms of accentuating social and income
inequalities, unsettling the public education system, and failing to increase academic performance
or building human capital led economic development (Dang and Rogers, 2008; Bray, 1999).
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Taking into account the interplays among the student and parent group, the teachers and the
learning centers group, and the government and other regulators group, we focus in developing a
game theoretic model with a three-stage temporal framework that captures the essence of the
interactions among these key stakeholders. Although there are few studies that discussed the
demand side of the private tutoring from the perspectives of the students and parents decision
making using a non-cooperative game framework (Choi, 2010; Yu and Ding, 2011), the possible
interplays among the key stakeholders inclusive the government under a temporal setting is not
extensively explored in the literature of private tutoring. In fact, most of the work on private
tutoring are empirical that mainly examined possible influences of household socio-economic and
other characteristics, and the level of schooling on the demand for private tutoring. Only a handful
of studies attempted to capture the interactions among the stakeholders but the focus of their work
are different. For example, Biswal (1999) attempted to capture the corruption aspect of private
tutoring, Sylvain et al. (1998) showed both public school and private tutorial market can coexist
under a particular labor market, and Jayachandran (2014) focused on the educational inequality
arising from income inequality. However, there are no role of government decision making to
influence the demand and supply of private tutoring in these models. In addition, school quality,
an important influential factor determining the level of private tutoring, is not taken into
consideration in most of the game theoretic models.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our three-stage game theoretic model
involving three stakeholders: parents determining the amount of private tutoring for their wards
(the demand side), teachers and learning centers determining the amount of private tutoring to
offer (the supply side), and the government and regulators determining their possible market
interventions to influence socially optimal level of private tutoring (influencing the demand-andsupply private tutoring market). Section 3 analyzes the optimal private tutoring offered by the
teachers and the learning centers given the school quality and income earning opportunities. In
Section 4, we discuss the optimal decision by the government and the regulators considering the
developments in the demand-and-the supply sides of the private tutoring market. We conclude in
Section 5.
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2. The Inter-temporal Game Theoretic Model of Private Tutoring
Following the interdependence among the three key stakeholders in determining the supply-anddemand model of private tutoring: the government regulators, the teachers, and the parents, our
inter-temporal game theoretic model have all three agents involve in the decision making process.
However, the process starts with the government deciding whether to ignore, discourage, or,
encourage private tutoring. In our simple game theoretic setup, we assume that the government
sets up a low-incentive regime to discourage private tutoring by imposing fines given its limited
budget in allocating the public fund between teacher’s salary and the school infrastructure for
public schools. Conversely, a higher private authority can perform the role of a government to
allocate resources between teacher’s salary and the school infrastructure for private schools. Since
quality of school education might be difficult to measure, we assumed that the quality of school
infrastructure could be used as a proxy to capture the quality of education provided at school. Once
the government or the higher private authority finalized their choices of public funds allocation,
the school teachers decide how much school work they should shirk to optimize their expected
earnings through teacher salary and private tutoring. Parents of the pupils, one of the three agents
in the decision making process, can influence the private tutoring supply of the teachers by
revealing tutorial demand on behalf of their wards. Given the tutorial demand and regulator
choices, the teachers determine their private tutorial supply at the last stage of the decision making
process. All in all, we have three (3) stages of decision making process involving three (3) agents
in period 1.

To keep the exposition simple, we allow the households to live for only two periods. Hence, period
2 will reveal the outcomes of the all three agents’ decision making processes taken during period
1. That is, the government-regulator of public schools or higher authority of a set of private schools
will maximize social returns from their respective education policy. The teachers will maximize
their expected income by allocating their resources between hours put in school duty and hours
put in for private tutoring. Lastly, the parents of the students, will maximize expected benefits by
experiencing the children to realize human capital potential by earning the market driven income
based on their educational achievements. In some countries, this parental expectation of benefits
could also be realized through the children’s achievement of getting access to better colleges and
universities based on their higher grades (Choi, 2010; Dang and Rogers, 2008).
6
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Starting with the households, we assume a household’s spending on private tuition is equivalent


to its savings. After allocating for subsistence consumption, C , and paying for taxes, T , out of
present income, Y , a household’s lifetime utility function can be expressed as,






U  C1  C    C2  C 





…

…

(1)

Where C1 and C2 refer to period 1 and period 2 consumption,  is the discount factor.
If household’s or parents demand qPT amount of private tuition in terms of total private tuition
hours for their wards by paying pPT per hour tuition fee, then, the period 1 household budget is,


C1  ( pPT  qPT )  Y  T  C  YDI public

…

…

(2a)

For private school going children, there is an additional private school fee, t private , which could be
accommodated to the household budget on top of the private tuition fees.


C1  ( pPT  qPT )  t private  Y  T  C  YDI private
With YDI private  YDI public

…

…

(2b)

Since a child’s education is received through two sources: (a) education received at school; and,
(b) education received through private tutorials, we assume that education received at school is
positively affected by teacher’s dutifulness at school, e (e  1) , and the quality of the school
education is captured through students exposure to the school infrastructure quality, s . Hence,
the child’s education function is,
E  s  e  qPT

…

…

(3)

Under two-period model, we assume the child becomes an adult in period 2. If the child is
successful in receiving the highest level of education, hedu , in period 1, then, as an adult in period
2, would realize an income according to the following earnings function,

Y ( E )  hedu

E2
E
, for E  hedu
2

…

h2
= edu for E  hedu
2

…

Combining equations (1) through (4), the parent’s utility maximization problem is,


Max U = C1 +  C2 - 1    C
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Subject to
C1  YDI public  pPT qPT
C2  Y ( E )  hedu  E 

E2
2

The first-order condition in terms of private tutoring leads to,
U
   (hedu  se)   qPT  pPT  0, if se  hedu
qPT

…

…

(5)

Parent’s will not demand any private tutorials for their wards if se  hedu , i.e., quality of education
received from schools exceeds or equivalent to the highest level of education received by a student.
Assuming, N number of parent couples (or households), parents’ inverse market demand for
private tutoring is,
pPT     hedu  se    

QPT
N

where, QPT  N  qPT

…

…

(6)

…

…

(7)

Reformulating (6), we get,
pPT     hedu  se   s  (1  e)    

QPT
N

From equation (7), three things can be concluded: (a) if C1  0 and pPT qPT  YDI public , the inverse
demand function is not valid; (b) if s  hedu , i.e. quality of school infrastructure could not provide
the highest level of education, tutorial demand will not go away. This will hold even teachers are
providing their maximum effort in school ( e  1 ) without any shirking of their school
responsibilities and duties; and, (c) if s  hedu , i.e. quality of school infrastructure meeting the
expectations of highest level of education received by students, but teachers decide to shirk on
their school responsibilities and duties ( e  1 ), tutorial demand from parents will not go away.

Now, if government decides to maximize social rather than private benefits, then, we expect that
the government’s goal would be to improve the overall level of school education in terms of quality
education. This could be achieved through policy incentives of allocating sufficient funds for
improving the school infrastructure quality and increasing the teacher salary. Regarding private
tutorials, government can encourage private tutoring practice by pursuing either doing nothing (no
penalty for shirking) or providing incentives for teachers through creation of public-private
8
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partnerships that can gradually improve the mechanisms of the private tutoring supply. On the
other hand, government can discourage private tutoring by either prohibiting with rules and
restrictions or by discouraging the private tutorial practice through introduction of fines and
penalties. For this paper, we are focusing on the aspect of government discouraging the private
tutorial practice with fines.

3. Optimal Private Tutoring based on Private Tutorials Market Structure
By modeling for the government policy to discourage private tutoring among the teachers, we can
assume a penalty structure, R , with the degree of penalty,  , which is influenced by teacher’s
dutifulness, (1  e) , and teacher’s salary, w . This could take the following form,

R    w 1  e 

…

…

(8)

…

…

(9)

Following the penalty structure, the teacher’s profit function becomes,

  w  pPT  QPT  R

= w  pPT  QPT    w 1  e 

Here, the teacher decides how much private tutoring to offer (QPT ) based on his decision to
transfer the time and effort saved through shirking responsibilities and duties at school. We assume
that the demand for private tutoring (QPT ) should be sufficient enough to generate enough interest
in the teacher to supply A(1  e) amount of private tuition. Moreover, even with complete shirking
(e  0) , we assume that the teacher falls short of providing highest desirable level of education,

hedu , to each student. With total N number of students being representative of all households, this
relationship could be defined as, aedu  hedu

with aedu 

A
, amount of education each student
N

receives through private tutorials.

Regarding the total supply of tutoring, we consider the teacher to be the leader with strong
reputation and goodwill in the private tutorial market in the subject area of interest. However, there
is also a bunch of followers providing private tutorials to students on the same subject but with no
well-established reputation. They could fall under a perfectly competitive market structure and act
as price-takers. For simplicity, we assume all n number of fringe firms face symmetric marginal
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f
f
cost of private tutoring, MC  cPT  qPT
and their supply decision is given by, pPT  cPT  qPT
. Based

on this setup, the total fringe tutorial supply curve is pPT  cPT 

QPTf
. So, the total supply of private
n

tutoring could be represented as,
f
Q  QPT  QPT

…

…

(10)

Given the school teacher’s supply of QPT amount of private tuition, the residual fringe demand
could be determined with the assumption that the fringe teachers pick up the unmet private tutorial
demand that could not be provided by the school teacher due to his or her time constraints. This
relationship could be expressed as,

Q 
Q

pPT    (hedu  s )  s (1  e)     PT     PT
N 
N

f
Q
= H    PT
N
f

Where, H     hedu  s   s 1  e     

…

…

(11)

QPT
.
N

Equating the total fringe demand, equation (11), with total fringe supply, equation (10), would lead
to the following relationship,
f
QPT
H

nN
cN   N

…

…

(12)

Equation (12) confirms the private tutorial market trends of observing the competitive fringe
f
tutorial, QPT
, to be increasing with the addition of new fringe teachers ( n ) but decreasing with

more market share of the leader, QPT , i.e. the school teacher with established reputation and
goodwill.

Considering the leader-follower sequential game setup, one can argue that the school teacher
decides on her tutorial supply prior to the fringe tutors’ choice which allows the teacher to maintain
her private tutorials market share. Based on this premise, we can substitute equation (12) into
equation (7), to get the tutorial demand that is relevant to the school teacher – the ‘leader’ of the
private tutorial market supply.

10
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pPT  H 




nN
H
N  cN   n 


cN
H
 cN   n 

…

…

(13)

 vH
Here, v 

cN
 1 captures the effect of the fringe tutors on the leader-follower sequential set
cN  n

of actions of private tutorial market supply. If the school teacher, the leader, could exercise
complete market power in the private tutorial market supply, then, we will have v  1 .
Taking into account the above developments and substitution for H , the school teacher’s
maximization problem becomes,
  w  pPT  QPT    w(1  e)
= w   v   hedu  s   s(1  e)   QPT   v

2
QPT
   w(1  e)
N

Subject to
QPT  A(1  e)

…

…

(14)

Performing the first-order condition of the above problem with respect to (1  e) leads to,


  vA (hedu  s)  2(aedu  s)  (1  e)   w  0
(1  e)

…

…

(15)

…

…

(16)

By re-arranging the terms,

(hedu  s)  2(aedu  s)(1  e) 
Marginal return to shirking


 vA

w

Marginal cost to shirking

Given the assumptions, equation (16) shows that the teacher will shirk to the extent where marginal
return to shirking is equal to the marginal cost of shirking. If marginal return is greater than the
marginal cost of shirking, the teacher will increase the level of shirking at school and allocate more
time for private tutoring unless she realizes MR  MC condition. On the other hand, once the
teacher finds out that her marginal return to shirking is lower than her marginal cost of shirking,
then, she will lower the level of her shirking unless MR  MC condition is achieved.
By further differentiating equation (15) with respect to (1  e) , we get the second-order condition,
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 2
 1  e 

2

 2 vA  aedu  s   0, iff aedu  s

…

…

(17)

Equation (17) reveals that the second order condition holds when the amount of private tutorials
A

provided by the teacher for each of her student  aedu   exceeds the amount of quality school
N


infrastructure ( s ) that is sufficient to motivate the same teacher to impart quality education
services at school.
Conversely, if aedu  s , the teacher will either shirk completely (e  0) or not shirk at all (e  1) .
From the teacher’s profit function setup at equation (14), complete dutifulness at school ( e  1 )
will lead to teacher’s profit to be equal to her wage earned from school service,
w

…

…

(18a)

On the other hand, complete shirking at school  e  0  will cause teacher’s profit to become,

   vA  hedu  aedu   w 1   

…

…

(18b)
Comparing equations (18a) and (18b),
The teacher chooses e  1 when w 

 vA   hedu  aedu 
; otherwise, the teacher completely shirks


 e  0 .
With partial shirking  0  e  1 under aedu  s , the school teacher’s optimal shirking decision
making will be based on the following set of conditions,
Choice for complete dutifulness (e* =1):

1  e   0
*

if w  wH ; where, wH   vA 

 hedu  s 
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Choice for partial shirking (0 < e* <1):



w
 hedu  s  
if wL  w  wH ;
1  e*   2  a svA
edu
 h  s  2aedu  and, w   vA   hedu  s 
where, w   vA  edu
L





H

Choice for complete shirking (e * = 0):

1  e   1
*

if w  wL ; where, wL   vA 

(hedu  s  2aedu )



…

…

(19)

From equation (19), we can see that the highest wage ( wH ) that could be earned from school is
decreasing with better quality school infrastructure ( s ) ; whereas, the lowest wage ( wL ) that could
be earned from school is increasing with better quality school infrastructure ( s ) .

Assuming partial shirking ( 0  e*  1 and wL  w  wH ) for the school teacher, the teacher’s
optimal dutifulness becomes,

 vA
w   sedu  b  2aedu 
e*  

…

2  aedu  sedu 

…

(20)

Equation (20) reveals that the school teacher’s dutifulness  e*  increases with teacher’s salary  w 
but with better school infrastructure  s  , such as the targeted professional development programs
for the teachers, the relationship is ambiguous or cannot be determined.

Resulting school education from equation (20) shows,

 vA
w   s  hedu  2aedu 
*

se  s 
2  aedu  s 

…

…

(21)

Equation (21) shows that education received at school is increasing with teacher’s salary  w  but
possible direction of better school infrastructure  s  influence cannot be determined.
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Taking into account the above equations, total education for a student is,
*

Qf
E  se  Q  PT
N
*

*

*
PT

*

Qf
= se  aedu (1  e )  PT
N
 vA 

  hedu  s     w 
= s 
  v  hedu 1  v 
2




*

*

…

…

(22)

Equation (22) shows that in case the school teacher is opting for complete dutifulness  e*  1 , the
student receives from school and the entire private tutoring hours coming from the fringe tutors.
Now, teacher’s expected income is,

 vA 

 w
 hedu  s 


 w
*
   vA 
4  aedu  s 
2

…

…

(23)

Equation (23) shows that the teacher’s expected income is decreasing in school infrastructure
quality ( s ) but in wages ( w ).

4. Optimal Policy Choice of the Government or the Higher Authority
Going back to stage 1 of the game, government or the higher authority decides how to allocate
public funds, Gschool , between the teacher’s salary and the school infrastructure. The government
clearly knows the implications of the allocation decisions on the school teacher’s choice of amount
of dutifulness at school and effort commitment for private tutoring.
Based on the sequence of events, the government official solves the following maximization
problem,

Max E  s, w
Subject to,

w  rS  Gschool (budget constraint)
  s, w  w0

(Teacher's participation constraint)

14
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Solving for equation (24) using a graphical approach, we find that the government official or the
higher authority will prefer to offer low-incentive for the school teacher by offering them lower
salary  w*  compared to the reservation salary  w0  . Since teacher’s dutifulness is negatively
affected as a result of such policy initiative, the ultimate goal of the government or the higher
authority becomes substituting school learning with more private tutoring services if the latter is
considered to be more efficient. With aedu  s , this policy initiative allows the government official
or the higher authority to allocate more for improving the quality of school infrastructure  s*  .

However, if evidence reveals that the school infrastructure is not reaching the level of quality as
expected with higher budget allocation, then, we expect more shirking from the school teachers
with lower salaries. As a result, greater education will be offered through private tutoring and the
government might find it optimal to offer a salary  w*  below the reservation salary  w0  . The
school teacher will have to make up the short fall through private tutoring fees. Hence, the optimal
policy choice of the higher authority and its overall impact on student education lend support to
reality regarding why private tutoring is becoming popular choice around the world especially
from the perspectives of the middle-and-low income countries facing tight budgets. These
combined results emanating from the government official or the higher authority’s policy choice
are illustrated in Figure 1.

5. Conclusion
Considering the growing trends in private tutoring or supplementary education around the world,
the policymakers are finding the importance of it in shaping the human capital and productivity of
nations (Dang and Rogers, 2008; de Castro and de Guzman, 2013). Evidence reveals mixed
responses from the government, where few countries went for outright ban on private tutoring and
while majority of the countries allowed private tutoring to flourish without any market
interventions (Bray, 2009; Dang and Rogers, 2008). In between, there are countries that are
actively controlling and regulating the private tutoring market (Dang and Rogers, 2008). Only a
handful are providing high-incentives to encourage participation of teachers in after school
programs, such as in USA (Burch et al., 2007). Interestingly, there is not much evidence of a
government imposing penalty or fine on school teachers to discourage after school private tutoring
15
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at their homes. Since the options of fines and subsidies to discourage as well as encourage private
tutoring cannot be overlooked, we consider four (4) policy options that are available to the
government. They are: (1) prohibition; (2) regulation; (3) encouragement; and, (4) doing nothing.
One can argue that policies (1) and (2) fall under low-incentives regime; whereas, policies (3) and
(4) under high-incentive regime to influence the private tutoring supply.

Since the interactions and relationships among the student and parents representing the demand
side, the school teachers and fringe tutors representing the supply side, and the government and
higher authorities representing the market interventionist side, play their respective roles in the
private tutoring market, we introduced a three-stage game theoretic model in this paper. In our
model, we focused on the low-incentive regime with government regulations (Policy 2) of fines
and penalties to discourage private tutoring. To keep the exposition simple, we do not address
increasing social inequalities that might arise through private tutoring. We achieved this objective
by ignoring income inequalities of the households by assuming that education contributes only to
future consumption as well as ensuring upward social mobility of the students.

Under government regulations with fines and penalties, our preliminary results reveal that a school
teacher’s dutifulness and education provided at school increases with salary. However, with
improvement in school infrastructures, such as, professional development aimed for teachers, the
directional relationship between school teacher’s dutifulness and school infrastructures cannot be
established. Findings also reveal that teacher’s expected income is decreasing in school
infrastructure through fall in private tuition demand and increasing in teacher’s salary. If the
government official or the higher authority cares only about the total education of the students and
therefore, unmindful of its sources, the optimal policy turns out to be offering lower wages for the
school teacher given a penalty or fine imposed on shirking responsibilities at school. Although
such policy would discourage a teacher’s school dutifulness, the social planner would achieve the
goal of providing maximum education to students by allocating more resources to improve the
quality of the school infrastructure but at the expense of substituting learning away from schools
towards more efficient private tutoring sector. To make up for the short fall of income, the school
teacher would increase more time and effort on private tutoring. Such outcome is more likely to
impact the demand side of the market positively since the parents (or, the households) would prefer
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to receive more education for their children given the existing institutions and school infrastructure
under such policy choice.

Findings from our study relate to the empirical evidence of increasing demand and supply of
private tutoring around the world given the resource constraints. The results might be more
relevant to middle-and-low income nations where teacher absence and shirking cannot be fully
eradicated due to higher monitoring costs, and the school infrastructure that cannot be fully
upgraded due to tight government and school budgets. For future directions of research, we want
to see whether the results hold under a policy regime with no penalty and fine. How the findings
play out if private tutoring is encouraged through subsidies? If school accessibility is not an issue
for government subsidized primary (elementary) and secondary schooling programs, can privatepublic partnerships be forged to improve teacher professional development and private tutoring
mix to enhance the overall quality of education? How the results be different under publiclyfunded but privately-managed schools such as the one that is offered through the Charter school
programs in USA? We want to explore these questions in our next subsequent steps.
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Appendix
Table 1: Cross national indicators of private supplementary tutoring
Location

Year of
study

Rural / Urban area

Primary / Secondary school

Bangladesh

2005

28% of rural and 52% of urban primary
school students consumed private tutoring

Cambodia

1997-1998

Canada
China

1990s
2004

Cyprus

2003

Egypt
Hong Kong

2004
2004 - 2005

India

1997

Japan

2007

Kenya

1997

Malta

1997-19998

Republic of
Korea

1997

Romania

1994

Taiwan

1998

Vietnam

2001-2002

31% of primary school students
consumed private tutoring
31% of 77 primary schools
surveyed consumed private
tutoring
Tutoring businesses in major cities grew 200 to 500 %
74% of primary 66% of lower
secondary and 54% of upper
secondary students consumed
private tutoring
87% of secondary school students
consume private tutoring
64 % in urban and 52% in rural
All levels
36% of primary 28% of lower
secondary,34 48% in upper
secondary school students
consumed private tutoring
70 % of children in urban areas consume
40% of primary students consume
private tutoring
private tutoring
90% children in urban areas consume private 65% of junior secondary students
tutoring
consume private tutoring
69 % of sixth graders consumed
private tutoring
50.5 % of primary and secondary
school students consume private
tutoring
72.9 % of primary school
students, 56% of middle school
and 32 % of high school students
consume private tutoring
32% of secondary school students consume
58 % of secondary school students
private tutoring
consume private tutoring
81.2% of secondary schools
students consume private tutoring
38% of primary school students
paid 29% of household
expenditure to consume private
tutoring

Source: Bray (2003 and 2009)
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Table 2: Characteristics of private tutoring (adapted from de Castro and de Guzman, 2014).

For whom

For what

Lean on
Low achieving students,
slow learners

With whom

Hidden remedial
activities
School teachers

By whom

Unregulated

Pass on
Students with busy
parents, lacking
assistance in their school
work
Supplementary activities
School teachers, small
scale institutions
Regulated as a business
entity

21

Ride on
Both low and high achieving
students, students whose
parents can afford tutorial fee
Structured, remedial and
enrichment activities
Multinational institutions,
learning centers, experts in
the field, university students
Regulated as a Business or
academic entity
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Table 3: The Inter-temporal Game Theoretic Setup
Period 1
3-stage
setup
Stage 1

Actors

Objective/ Main Goals

Actions

Higher Authority at
Government
funded
public School
(or,
privately funded private
school)

Maximize social return from
education through policies geared
through private tutoring

(1) Ignore – do nothing
(2) Prohibit and Regulate – Lowincentive policies;
(3) Encourage – High-incentive
policies

Stage 2

Teachers involved with
private tutoring

Stage 3

Parents

Decides on four basic policy
responses to private tutoring:
(1) Ignore – most countries;
(2) Prohibit – South Korea;
(3) Regulate – Mauritius, Hong Kong
(4) Encourage – Singapore, Taiwan
Maximize expected income through
teaching salary and private tutoring

Maximize net benefits of private
tutoring
investments
allocated
(private tuition) for children

How much time to allocate for
private tutoring (optimal effort for
private tutoring)
Amount of money to set aside for
private tuition

Period 2
Actors

Objective / Main Goals

Higher Authority at Public or Private
school

Maximize social return from education policy

Teachers involved with private
tutoring

Maximize expected income

Parents

Children grow up and realize an income through an earnings function
Or, Children grow up and get access to better colleges and universities
through higher grades
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Figure 1: Optimal Policy Choice of Higher Authority and Its Impacts on the School Education
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